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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

1. Summary judgment shall be rendered when "the pleadings, depositions and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving part is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. "l.R.C.P.
56(c). On appeal the Appellate Court liberally construes the entire record in favor of the
nonmoving party and draws all reasonable inferences and conclusion in that party's favor. Clark
v. Spokesman-Review, 163 P.3d 216,219, 144 Idaho 427,430 (Idaho 2007) Steele v. Spokesman
Review, 138 Idaho 249,251, 61 P.3d 606,608 (2002). lfthe evidence reveals no disputed issues
of material fact, summary judgment is proper. Id.
2.
When a claim or part of a claim must be proved by clear and convincing evidence,
generally on a motion for summary judgment the Idaho Appellate Courts do not consider
whether a party has produced clear and convincing evidence, but only "whether the evidence is
sufficient to create a triable issue of fact." Country Cove Dev., Inc. v. May, 143 Idaho 595, 599,
150 P.3d 288, 292 (2006).
3.
Idaho appellate courts review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Clark v.
Spokesman-Review, 163 P.3d 216, 144 Idaho 427 (Idaho 2007), Post Falls Trailer Park, 131
Idaho at 636, 962 P.2d at 1020." Id at 222 and 433.
4. Regarding the issue of want of probable cause, Allen v.Moyle, 84 Idaho 18, 24-25,
367 P .2d 579 (1961). It states that The advice o(counsel relied upon must come from an
independent, disinterested attorney. Howard, 85 Idaho 286, 291, 3 79) .2d 414, 417.
5. A plaintiff is entitled to prove the defendant's state of mind through circumstantial
evidence, see Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 160 (1979); Tavoulareas v. Piro, 260 U.S.
App.D.C. U.S. App.D.C.9, 66, 817 F. 2d 762, 789 (en bane), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 (1987),
and it cannot be said that evidence concerning motive or care never bears any relation to the
actual malice inquiry." Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 668,
109 S. Ct. 2997 (1989); Clark v. Spokesman Review, 144 Idaho 427, 163 P.3d 216 (Idaho 2007):
Gardner v. Hollifield, 97 Idaho 607, at 610,549 P.2d 266, at 269 (Idaho 1976).
6.
The standard of review of a trial court's decision of issues involving the
introduction of evidence, is under an abuse of discretion [281 P .3d 120] standard. Clair v. Clair,
281 P.3d 115, 153 Idaho 278 (Idaho 2012); State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 521, 81 P.3d 1230,
1231 (2003). The trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence. Id. at 521-22, 81
P.3d at 1231-32. "Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence
unless the ruling is a manifest abuse of the trial court's discretion and a substantial right of the
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL -7

party is affected." Burgess V Salmon River Canal Co., Ltd., 127 Idaho 565, 574, 903 P.2d 730,
739 (1995).
7. The question of whether evidence is relevant is reviewed de novo, while the decision
to admit relevant evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. [1] State v. Shutz, 143 Idaho
200,202, 141 p.3d 1069, 1071 (2006). A district court's improper exclusion of evidence will be
overturned on appeal if it affects a party's substantial right. Clair v. Clair, 281 P.3d 115, 153
Idaho 278 (Idaho 2012); Perception Const. Management, Inc. v. Bell, 254 P.3d 1246, 1249, 1250
151 Idaho 250 (Idaho 2011); I.RE. 103; I.R.C.P. 6l(a); Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co.,
Ltd., 127 Idaho 565, 574, 903 P.2d 730, 739 (1995).
8.
Evidence that is relevant to a material and disputed issue concerning the crime
charged is generally admissible. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 143, 191 P.3d 217, 221 (2008).
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence." LR. E. 401: see also Stevens, 146 Idaho at 143, 191 P.3d at 221. Whether
a fact is of consequence or material is determined by its relationship to the legal theories
presented by the parties. State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664,671,227 P.3d 918, 925 (2910). We
review questions ofrelevance de novo. State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 764, 864 P.2d 596,
602 (1993); State v. Houser, 41540 (unpublished) (Idaho App. 2014).

9.
Appeals from an order of summary judgment are reviewed de novo, and on appeal
the standard of review is the same as the standard used by the trial court in ruling on a motion for
summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issues as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. LR. C. P.
56(c). Under this standard, disputed facts are construed in favor of the non-moving party, and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are drawn in favor of the non-moving
party. Where the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then only a question of law
remains, over which this Court exercises free review. Huber v. Lightforce USA, Inc., 41887
(Idaho December 15, 2015); Trotter v. Bank of NY Mellon, 152 Idaho 842, 845-46, 275 P.3d
857, 860-61 (2012) (footnotes, internal case citation, and internal quotation marks omitted).
10.
When reviewing an order for summary judgment, the standard ofreview for the
Appellate Court is the same standard as that used by the district court in ruling on the motion.
Summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c). Disputed facts should
be construed in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn
from the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. The Appellate Court exercises
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free review over questions of law. Huber v. Lightforce USA, Inc., 41887 (Idaho December 15,
2015); Fuller v. Dave Callister, 252 P.3d 1266, 1269, 150 Idaho 848,851 (Idaho 2011); 149
Idaho 609,613,238 P3d 209,213 (2010) (quoting Vavold v. State, 148 Idaho 44, 45,218 P.3d
388, 389 (2009).
11.
The standard of review on appeal from an order granting summary judgment is the
same standard that is used by the district court in ruling on the summary judgment. Summary
judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions on file
show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter oflaw. McCann v. McCann, 275 P.3d 824 (Idaho 2012).
12.
When an Appellate Court reviews an order dismissing an action pursuant to
summary judgment, after viewing all facts and inferences from the record in favor of the nonmoving party, the Court will ask whether a claim for relief has been stated. The issue is not
whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer evidence to
support the claims. 145 Idaho 670, 672-73, 183 P.3d 758, 760-61 (2008) (internal citations and
quotations omitted). In addition, "the Court reviews an appeal from an order of summary
judgment de novo, and the Court's standard ofreview is the same as the standard used by the
trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Taylor v. McNichols, 243 P.3d 642,
648, 149 Idaho 826, 832 (Idaho 2010); Curlee v. Kootenai Cnty. Fire and Rescue, 148 Idaho
391,394,224 P.3d 458,461 (2008).
13.
An Appellate Court will not set aside the trial court's findings of fact unless they
are clearly erroneous. As to questions of law, the Court exercises free review. Rumberger v.
Rumberger, 995 P.2d 809, 811, 134 Idaho 39, 41 (Idaho 2000); See Jensen v. Jensen 128 Idaho
600,604,917 P.2d 757, 761 (1996).
14.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is to liberally construe
the entire record in favor of the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences and
conclusions in that party's favor. Steele v. Spokesman-Review, 138 Idaho 249,251, 61 P.3d 606,
608 (2002). Clark v. Spokesman-Review, 144 Idaho 427, 163 P.3d 216, (Idaho 2007).

I 5.

A party responding to a summary judgment motion is not required to present
evidence on every element of his or her case at that time, but must rather establish a genuine
issue of material fact regarding the element or elements challenged by the moving party.
Thomson v. Idaho Insurance Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 530, 887 P.2d 1034, 1037; Farm
Credit Bank ofSpokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270,272, 869 P.2d 1365, 1368 (1994).

16. In Manganiello v. City o(New York, 612 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2010), the Second
Circuit upheld a jury's verdict and judgment (including $1.426 million in compensatory
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damages) against the defendant former detective charged with§ 1983 Fourth Amendment
malicious prosecution of the plaintiff who was prosecuted for murder but acquitted. The
defendant argued that he should have been granted judgment as a matter of law because probable
cause existed, or should be presumed to have existed by virtue of a grand jury indictment of the
plaintiff for murder. Rejecting the argument, the Second Circuit observed that the presumption of
probable cause from a grand jury indictment could be rebutted by evidence that the indictment
was procured by fraud, perjury or the suppression of evidence by the police officer. In this case
there was ample evidence to support the jury's findings that the defendant engaged in at least
one of these kinds of misconduct: the defendant refrained from making inquiries into other
possible suspects, ignored evidence that the plaintiff was not guilty, declined to inform the
prosecutor ofpossibly exculpatory evidence, secured an inculpatory statement from a witness
by promising not to disclose that witness's known criminal activities and included in some of
his own reports statements adverse to the plaintiff that were contradicted by persons with firsthand knowledge of the facts. Furthermore, it was clear that the defendant caused the
initiation or continuation of the criminal proceedings against the plaintiff. Finally, there was
sufficient evidence of malice in the sense that the defendant acted with "something other than
a desire to see the ends ofjustice served." 612 F.3d at 164.
Malice as defined by Idaho Statue 18-101 (4). The words "malice," and
"maliciously," import a wish to vex, annoy, or injure another person. For a malicious prosecution
action, the standard for proving "malice" is less rigorous than the standard for proving "actual
malice". Malice may be proved by extrinsic evidence such as the defendant bore a grudge
against the offended party or there was rivalry or ill-feeling between them. [from Luis B Reyes,
Revised Penal code, Book 11, 15th ed., p. 951, citing People vs. Hogan, CA, 55 OG 1597.]
17.

18. Regarding Probable Cause: The advice of counsel relied upon must come from an
independent, disinterested attorney. Howard, 85 Idaho 286,291,379) .2d 414,417.
19. The malice element is usually not difficult for the plaintiff to prove where
there is an absence of probable cause, Seelig v. Harvard Coop. Soc 'y., 246 N.E.2d 642,646
(Mass. 1969) (lack of probable cause is a sufficient basis for an inference of malice).and it does
not require evidence of subjective ill will. If the defendant's actions are willful and done
purposely, and known to him to be wrong and unlawful, malice is established. United States
v. Limone JV, 497 F.Supp.2d at 220 (D.Mass.2007).
20. The standard of review of a trial court's decision of issues involving the introduction
of evidence, is under an abuse of discretion [281 P.3d 120] standard. Clair v. Clair 281 P.3d 115,
153 ldaho 278 (Idaho 2012); State v. Perry, 139 ldaho 520,521, 81 P.3d 1230, 1231 (2003). The
trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence, Id. at 521-22, 81 P.3d at 1221-32.
"Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless the ruling
is a manifest abuse of the trial court's discretion and a substantial right of the party is affected."
Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., 127 Idaho 565,574,903 P.2d 730, 739 (1995).
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21. The question of whether evidence is relevant is reviewed de novo, while the
decision to admit relevant evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. [1] State v. Shutz, 143
Idaho 200, 202, 141 P .3d 1069, 1071 (2006). A district court's improper exclusion of evidence
will be overturned on appeal if it affects a party's substantial right. Clair v. Clair, 281 P.3d 115,
153 Idaho 278 (Idaho 2012); Perception Const. Management, Inc. v. Bell, 254 P.3d 1246, 1249,
1250 151 Idaho 250 (Idaho 2011); LR.E. 103; LR.C.P. 61(a); Burgess v. Salmon River Canal
Co., Lt., 127 Idaho 565, 574, 903 P.2d 730, 739 (1995).
22. Evidence that is relevant to a material and disputed issue concerning the crime
charged is generally admissible. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 143, 191 P.3d 217,221 (2008).
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence." I.R.E. 401; see also Stevens, 146 Idaho at 143, 191 P.3d at 221. Whether a
fact is of consequence or material is determined by its relationship to the legal theories presented
by the parties. State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664,671,227 P.3d 918, 925 (2010). We review
questions ofrelevance de novo. State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 764, 864 P.2d 596, 602
(1993); State v. Houser, 41540 (unpublished) (Idaho App. 2014).
23. Appeals from an order of summary judgment are reviewed de novo, and this
Court's standard of review is the same as the standard used by the trial court in ruling on a
motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
I.R.C.P. 56(c). Under this standard, disputed facts are construed in favor of the non-moving
party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are drawn in favor of the
non-moving party. Where the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then only a
question of law remains, over which this Court exercises free review. Huber v. Lightforce USA,
Inc., 41887 (Idaho December 15, 2015); Trotter v. Bank ofN.Y. Mellon, 152 Idaho 842, 845-46,
275 P.3d 857, 860-61 (2012) (footnotes, internal case citations, and internal quotation marks
omitted).
24. The standard of review on appeal from an order granting summary judgment is the
same standard that is used by the district court in ruling on the summary judgment motion.
Summary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and
admissions on file show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter oflaw. McCann v. McCann, 275 P.3d 824 (Idaho 2012).
25. When reviewing an order for summary judgment, the standard of review for the
Appellate Court is the same standard as that used by the district court in ruling on the motion.
Summary judgment is appropriate if" the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). Disputed facts
should be construed in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL -11

drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. The Appellate Court
exercises free review over questions oflaw. Fuller v. Dave Callister, 252 P.3d 1266, 1269, 150
Idaho 848, 851 (Idaho 2011); 149 Idaho 609, 613, 238 P.3d 209, 213 (2010) (quoting Vavold v.
State, 148 Idaho 44, 45,218 P.3d 388,389 (2009).
26. When an Appellate Court reviews an order dismissing an action pursuant to
summary judgment, after viewing all facts and inferences from the record in favor of the nonmoving party, the Court will ask whether a claim for relief has been stated. The issue is not
whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer evidence to
support the claims. 145 Idaho 670, 672-73, 183 P.3d 758, 760-61 (2008) (internal citations and
quotations omitted). In addition, " the Court reviews an appeal from an order of summary
judgment de novo, and the Court's standard ofreview is the same as the standard used by the
trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Taylor v McNichols, 243 P.3d 642,648,
149 Idaho 826, 832 (Idaho 2010); Curlee v. Kootenai Cnty Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391,394,
224 P.3d 458, 461 (2008).
27. The Appellate Court employs an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a
district court's denial of a motion to amend a complaint to add additional causes of action. Spur
Prod. Corp. v. Stoel Rives LLP, 142 Idaho 41, 43, 122 P.3d 300, 302 (2005). When reviewing an
exercise of discretion on the part of a district court, this Court considers: " (1) whether the court
correctly perceived that the issue was one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
specific choices available to it; and (3) whether it reached its decision by an exercise ofreason."
Id. (quoting Estate of Becker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522,527, 96 P.3d 623,628 (2004)); Taylor
v. McNichols, 243 P.3d 642,648, 149 Idaho 826, 832 (Idaho 2010).
28. An Appellate Court will not set aside the trial court's findings of fact unless they are
clearly erroneous.; As to questions oflaw, the Court exercises free review. Rumberger v.
Rumberger, 995 P.2d 809,811, 134 Idaho 39, 41 (Idaho 2000); See Jensen v. Jensen 128 Idaho
600,604, 917 P.2d 757, 761 (1996).
29. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is to liberally construe
the entire record in favor of the nonrnoving party and draw all reasonable inferences and
conclusions in that party's favor. Steele v. Spokesman-Review, 138 Idaho 249,251, 61 P.3d 606,
608 (2002). If the evidence then reveals no disputed issues of material fact, summary judgment is
proper. Id. Clark v. Spokesman-Review, 144 Idaho 427, 163 P.3d 216, (Idaho 2007).
30.

A party responding to a summary judgment motion is not required to present

evidence on every element of his or her case at that time, but must rather establish a genuine
issue of material fact regarding the element or elements challenged by the moving party.
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Thomson v. Idaho Insurance Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 530, 887 P. 2d 1034, 1037; Farm
Credit Banko/Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270,273,869 P.2d 1365, 1368 (1994).
31.

A plaintiff is entitled to prove the defendant's state of mind through circumstantial

evidence, see Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 160 (1979); Tavoulareas v. Piro, 260 U.S.
App.D.C. U.S. App.D.C.9, 66, 817 F. 2d 762, 789 (en bane), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 (1987),
and it cannot be said that evidence concerning motive or care never bears any relation to the
actual malice inquiry." Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 668,
109 S. Ct. 2997 (1989); Clark v. Spokesman Review, 144 Idaho 427, 163 P.3d 216 (Idaho 2007):

Gardner v. Hollifield, 97 Idaho 607, at 610, 549 P.2d 266, at 269 (Idaho 1976).
32.

Under Idaho law there are six elements which must be proved in a case for

malicious prosecution. They are: 1. There was a prosecution of plaintiff; 2. The prosecution
terminated in favor of the plaintiff; 3. That the defendant was responsible for the prosecution; 4.
That the defendant was activated by malice; 5. That there was a lack of probable cause to charge
plaintiff; 6. That the plaintiff sustained damages. Rincover v. State, 128 Idaho 653, 917 P.2d
1293 (1996); Clark v. Alloway, 67 Idaho 32, 170 P.2d 425 (1946); Robinson v. White, 90 Idaiho
548, 414 P.2d 666 (1966); Myers v. City of Pocatello, 98 Idaho 168, 559 P.2d 1136 1977),

Baddell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 765 P.2d 126 (1988); Shanahan v. Grigray, 131 Idaho 664,
962,962 P.2d 1048 (1998); and Butler v. Elle et al, 281 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2001).
33.

The substance of probable cause is a "reasonable ground for belief of guilt." Mink

v. Knox, 613 F.3d 995, 1003 (10th Cir.2010) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
175, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)). Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances
are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe a crime has been committed.
Id. If evidence is falsified or withheld, the probable cause determination is made by

considering whether, excluding the falsified inculpatory evidence or including the withheld
exculpatory evidence, probable cause existed to prosecute.
34. Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a person
of reasonable caution to believe a crime has been committed. Id. If evidence is falsified or
withheld, the probable cause determination is made by considering whether, excluding the
falsified inculpatory evidence or including the withheld exculpatory evidence, probable cause
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existed to prosecute. See Pierce, 359 F.3d at 1295. - See more at: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/usl Oth-circuit/1576115.html#sthash.Xl Ff4gEN.dpuf
35.

In a ruling on summary judgment motions, the court does not resolve conflicting

evidence with respect to disputed material facts, nor does it make credibility determinations.
T W Electrical Serivce, Inc. v. Pacific Electrical Contractors Ass 'n, 809 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.
1987).
36. In a successful action for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must show: (1) that
there was a prosecution; (2) that it terminated in favor of plaintiff; (3) that the defendant was the
prosecutor; (4) that the defendant was actuated by malice; ( 5) that there was want of probable
cause; and (6) that damages were sustained. Howard v. Felton, 85 Idaho 286,290, 379 P.2d 414,
416 (1963).
37.
Summary judgment must be denied ifreasonable persons could reach differing
or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence. Smith v. Meridian Joint School
District No. 2, 128 Idaho 714, 718, 918 P.2d 583, 587 (1996).
38.
In a malicious prosecution action, the district court determines whether the defendant
had probably cause for the action and if there are no disputed facts as to the investigation made
by the defendant or concerning the defendant's conduct in pursuing the lawsuit, the district court
can resolve issues of probable cause as a matter oflaw. Badell, 115 Idaho 101, 103, 765 P.2d
126, 128; Shannahan v. Gigray, 131 Idaho 664,667, 962 P.2d 1048, 1051 (1998).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case

Appellant, Candace "Andi" Elliott, appeals the dismissal on summary judgment in
her Malicious Prosecution claim against the Respondent. Respondent initiated a false claim of
trespass against Plaintiff 24 July 2011 (CR- 2011-3409) causing her to undergo a two year court
process culminating in Plaintiff's acquittal on 2 July 2013 when the Respondent/Defendant
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testified under oath on 5 June 2013 that he never saw Plaintiff on his property.
Plaintiff voluntarily investigates complaints of animal abuse, neglect, and abandonment
in South East Idaho, and assists law enforcement in the notification of, investigation of, and
enforcement of the laws (at times acting under the color oflaw) regarding such; and with her
previous capacity as a member and then President of The Humane Society of the Upper Valley
and currently in her capacity as President of For The Love of Pets Foundation, Inc., has provided
financial support for the treatment, transport, care, feeding and housing of neglected, abused and
abandoned animals in and for the County of Jefferson as well as other counties since 2002 and
continuing to the month of this filing.
On 24 July 2011, Plaintiff received a call from a concerned citizen regarding some
neglected horses. The horses in questioned happened to be located across the public roadway
from Defendant's home who was unknown to Plaintiff at that time. Plaintiff and (her husband
who often accompanies her on animal cruelty complaints) was on the public roadway at all
times taking pictures of the neglected horses. While at the scene of the horses in question,
Plaintiff called the Jefferson County Sheriffs Office (JCSO) and requested a welfare check of
the horses. Meanwhile Defendant who lived across the roadway from the horses called the JCSO
demanding that the Plaintiff be charged with trespass as indicated by the recording of the JCSO
Dispatch audio recording.
Defendant's pictures and his own testimony on 5 June 2013 under direct questioning by
the Honorable Judge Robert Crowley corroborated the fact that he never saw Plaintiff on his
property. None of the three witness statements taken on the day of the alleged incident by the
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
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responding deputy stated that Plaintiff had trespassed. The deputy testified that he had no
documentation that he had previously trespassed Plaintiff from Defendant's property.
According to the JCSO Deputy's notes# 1101736.001 as follows:
"On 04-20-2011 at approximately 18:00 Hrs dispatch advised of an animal abuse complaint
made by an anonymous female saying there was a malnourished horse in the corals behind the
home at 1998 N 2500 E in Jefferson County, Idaho. (Defendant's address) Dispatch said the
female had advised she did not want (Andi Elliott) Candace White Elliott to get involved."
Defendant said he had Plaintiff trespassed from his property only Plaintiff had no knowledge of
the alleged call from the Deputy; the Deputy could produce no documentation at trial that he had
ever made such a call to Plaintiff and there were no supporting phone records. Nor did Plaintiff
even know of Defendant or his old horse until charged with trespass by him on 24 July 2011.
All pictures taken by Defendant at the time of the alleged trespass show that Plaintiff
and the car in which she was a passenger was on the public roadway at all times. It is clearly
stated in Defendant's Warranty Deed that the public roadway is excluded from his private
property. Yet the Defendant insisted that Plaintiff be charged with trespass for standing on the
public roadway as documented by Defendant's comments on the Deputy's DVD recording
during his investigation of the alleged incident, Defendant's signature on the citation, and the
audio recording of the JCSO Dispatch.
During the investigation of the Defendant's complaint, the Deputy specifically inquired
of the Defendant asking whether the Plaintiff was on the public roadway or in the gutter also
public property. Ignoring the Deputy's question, Defendant proceeded to sign a complaint
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against Plaintiff. All of Defendant's actions/statements were recorded by the Deputy's DVD on
24 July 2011.
After two years of court appearances and five days of trial spanning seventeen months,
Defendant testified on 5 June 2013 under the direct questioning by the presiding judge (The
Honorable Judge Robert Crowley) and subsequently by Plaintiffs attorney that he never saw
Plaintiff on his property. Plaintiff was acquitted on 2 July 2013.
Plaintiff filed a malicious civil suit against Defendant on 6 January 2015. Defendant
submitted a sworn affidavit on 22 September 2015 that was a complete reversal of his previous
testimony stating that Plaintiff had trespassed which was an obvious attempt to avoid culpability
on the part of the Defendant. The presiding judge granted summary judgment to Defendant.
Plaintiff appeals the trial court's decision granting summary judgment to Defendant
based on the assertion that probable cause existed when the evidence clearly shows that:
- that Defendant refused to respond to the Deputy's questioning asking Defendant if Plaintiff was
on public roadway or the "gutter" both of which are public property;
- that the Defendant's WARRANTY DEED explicitly excludes the public road and the "gutter"
from Defendant's property;
-that the Defendant's own pictures show that Plaintiff was on the paved public roadway;
-that the Defendant clearly had a duty to determine if the roadway was public property and was
negligent in his failure to do so;
-that Defendant failed to reveal that there was another person who continued to harass
Defendant about his old horse (as recorded on the JCSO Dispatch recording of 8 September
2011); information that was withheld during Plaintiffs trial and only discovered by
happenstance from a discovery request in the civil suit and to which Plaintiffs attorney will
testify;

APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL

-17

-that the Defendant and the actively involved county prosecutor (Jefferson County Prosecutor
Robin Dunn) in Plaintiffs criminal case were long time family friends.
-Plaintiff was acquitted on 2 July 2013
On 22 September 2015, Defendant Young filed an Affidavit in Opposition to Plaintiffs
:Motion for Summary Judgment (copy attached). In his affidavit Defendant directly contradicts
his recorded statements to the responding deputy and during his sworn testimony at trial. The
following are excerpts from Defendant's sworn affidavit:
DEFENDANT KURT YOUNG writes: July 24, 2011 "Candace Elliott (Plaintiff) got out of the
passenger side and walked around the car onto the public road." Defendant Young stated to the
officer and as is recorded in the officer's official statement dated 24 July 2011 that the car was
parked in front of his house and on the public road as depicted by Defendant's pictures.
DEFENDANT KURT YOUNG writes: "The place where the car was first stopped and Candace
Elliott got out of the car is located on my property." Defendant testified that he never saw
Plaintiff (Elliott) get out of the car.
DEFENDANT KURT YOUNG writes: I explained to him (Deputy) what I had seen, including
where the car was located when the car first parked in my driveway and she (Plaintiff) got out of
the car. I pointed specifically to that location so the deputy could see where it was." False, Kurt
Young never told the above to the Deputy as documented on the Deputy's DVD recording. Kurt
Young did point out to the deputy the location of the car that was on the paved public roadway.
DEFENDANT KURT YOUNG writes: "Although I signed a citation it was never used in the
criminal case against Candace Elliott." (Plaintiff) Because Defendant signed a criminal citation
against me, Plaintiff was charged with trespass.
DEFENDANT KURT YOUNG writes: "According to Deputy Clements' Affidavit, 'Kurt said
that Candace W. Elliott had been on his property taking photos of his neighbor Dan Murdock's
property and animals. (Note: Plaintiff had received a complaint about the poor horses belonging
to the Murdock's.) Kurt said Candace had been on his property not on the roadway." Kurt
testified multiple times (5 June 2013) that he never saw me on his property. Kurt refused to
answer the Deputy when the Deputy specifically asked if the Plaintiff was on the public roadway
or in the gutter (both public property).
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL -18

There are other statements made in the Defendant's sworn affidavit that deviate from the
actual recording made by the Deputy on the day of the alleged incident. Defendant leaves out of
his affidavit that he told law enforcement that he had pictures of the alleged trespass. No pictures
of such event were presented at trial and the Deputy testified in February 2012 (first day of trial)
that he had been given no such pictures. Defendant's conflicting testimonies should call into
question any statements made by him thereby impeaching his Affidavit dated 2 Yz years later.
The trial court granted Summary Judgment to Defendant in February 2016.
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff filed her complaint against Defendant for malicious prosecution in the District
Court on January 6, 2015, alleging that Defendant falsely and maliciously accused her of
trespassing. Defendant was represented by the County Prosecutor Robin Dunn who was an active
participant during Plaintiffs trial as documented by court minutes
Upon motion to disqualify opposing counsel by Plaintiff on March 24, 2015, the
Honorable Judge Alan Stephens disqualified the Prosecutor citing violations of the I.R.P.C.) On
May 29, 2015, Defendant retained attorney, Royce B. Lee, Esq.
There were various motions filed in an attempt to have Defendant's counsel to respond
to discovery requests. For over 100 days Defendant's counsel refused to respond to discovery
requests.
In August 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion to recuse based on the fact that the judge
had already ruled against Plaintiff in two previous cases based on the same set o[facts.
Motion was denied on September 29, 2015.
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On December 15, 2015 a jury trial was scheduled for February 23, 2016.
On February 1, 2016 hearing for motions on summary judgment.
On February 5, 2016 Court granted summary judgment to Defendant.
On March 15, 2016, Plaintiff filed Notice of Appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Plaintiff and Defendant are residents of Hamer, Jefferson County, Idaho population 51
(citing the US Census Bureau 2013). Before the alleged incident, Plaintiff did not know of
Defendant.
On July 24, 2011, Plaintiff, Candace "Andi" Elliott, received a call from a neighbor about
some poor horses. Plaintiff and her husband drove to the site of the horses. Upon observing
several very thin horses, Plaintiff excited the car driven by her husband which never left the
paved road. (Per affidavit of the driver, John Grubb.) Plaintiff stood at all times on the paved
road and the public right of way taking pictures of the horses in questionable condition located
across the road from Defendant's property.
While at the scene, Plaintiff called the JCSO Dispatch explained the situation and
requested a welfare check of the horses as documented by the JCSO audio recording. Plaintiff
then re-entered the car and headed home.
Meanwhile, Plaintiff had noticed a man who was very agitated standing in front of a home
located immediately across the roadway from the horses as she indicated in her witness
statement. Plaintiff subsequently learned that it was the Defendant who called in a complaint
about Plaintiff stating to Dispatch that he wanted Plaintiff charged with trespass and that he had
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL -20

pictures of the alleged trespass.

Defendant produced no pictures of Plaintiff trespassing at trial.Defendant testified that
he had no pictures of Plaintiff on his property. Defendant and Plaintiffs husband (Grubb) took
pictures of each other taking pictures. Not ONE of the pictures taken by all three parties showed
that at any time neither the Plaintiff or the car in which she was riding had left the pavement
public right of way.
JCSO Deputy John Clements responded to the scene shortly after the alleged
trespass. His video-taped investigation showed Defendant refusing to respond to his question
as to whether Plaintiff was on the public roadway on the gutter (both public property). The video
also shows multiple malicious comments made by Defendant against Plaintiff. The video ends at
the point where Defendant prepares to sign a citation against Plaintiff.
A few weeks later (August 2011) Plaintiff was officially and formally charged with
trespass by the office Jefferson County Prosecutor Robin Dunn (who has admitted to being a
long time family friend of Defendant) based on Defendant's signed complaint.
Please note: Mr. Dunn has stated in a sworn affidavit that
"I was not involved in the day-today prosecution of the case." However
court minutes indicate that he was present on_multiple days, addressed the
court, questioned witnesses, signed subpoenas, and at one hearing was the only
attorney representing the State. Mr. Dunn also initiated the imposition of a "gag"
order against Plaintiff.
Plaintiffs criminal trespass bench trial began in February 2012, followed by another trial
date in March of 2012, followed by three (3) more trial dates 15 months later, on June 5, 6, and 7
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of 2013. On 5 June 2013, Defendant Young testified multiple times under direct questioning by
the presiding judge and subsequently by Plaintiffs attorney that he never saw Plaintiff on his
property. Plaintiff was acquitted on 2 July 2013.
In response to Defendant Young's false accusation and later recantation, Plaintiff filed
a Malicious Prosecution suit against Defendant on January 6, 2015. (Jefferson County Prosecutor
Robin Dunn offered to represent Defendant. Plaintiff filed a motion to disqualifying opposing
counsel which was granted based on the Prosecutor's violation of the I. R. P. C.)
Defendant's sworn affidavit submitted to the court on 22 September 2015 is in direct
conflict to his testimony on 5 June 2013.
It is believed that the current counsel, Mr. Royce B. Lee. Esq. agrees that all elements of
a Malicious Prosecution suit have been met with the exception of the fifth element: (1) there was
a prosecution (2) the original action terminated in favor of the plaintiff; (3) the defendant was
instrumental in initiating the prosecution; (4) that he was actuated by malice; (5) there
want of probable cause; and (6) the amount of damages that Plaintiff sustained. Russell v.

Chamberlain, 12 Idaho 299, 303, 85 P. 926 (1906); Robinson v. White, 90 Idaho 548,414 P.2d
666 (1966); Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 667; Howard v. Felton, 85 Idaho 286,290, 379
P.2d 414,416 (1963).

It is the fifth element, "want ofprobable cause", that is the basis of this appeal... as there it is
clearly documented and admitted by Defendant that Defendant initiated the prosecution, the
action was terminated in favor of the Plainti{L the Defendant acted with malice as evident on the
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Deputy's DVD, that the prosecutor was not impartial and independent and the Plaintiffsustained
damages in the amount 0($25,000 for attorney's fees.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
a.

Did the District Judge err in granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant?

b.

Did the District Judge err in not taking into account that Defendant provided documented

false statements to law enforcement?
c.

Did the District Judge err in not considering that Defendant and the substantially involved

Prosecutor (Jefferson County Prosecutor Robin Dunn) were long time family friends?
d. Did the District Judge err in not considering that Defendant's sworn affidavit of September
2015 submitted in this current matter was in direct conflict to his testimony of June 5, 2013
during Plaintiffs trial?
e.

Did the District Judge err in failing to consider that the Prosecutor has a long time history

of bias against Plaintiff as evidence by prior writings/actions against Plaintiff?
f. Was it error for the District Judge to fail to consider Defendant's documented and recorded
animus towards Plaintiff?
g. Did the District Judge err in failing to consider that Defendant waited two years before
testifying that he never saw Plaintiff on his property?
h. Did the District Judge err in failing to consider that Defendant withheld information the
court/law enforcement/prosecutor that the harassment of Defendant about his old horse
continued AFTER he charged Plaintiff as documented by the Deputy's call to the JCSO on 8
September 2011?

J.
Was it error for the District Judge to fail consider that there was no evidence presented by
law enforcement that the Plaintiff had ever been trespassed from Defendant's property?
k.

Did the District Judge err in failing to recuse himself as requested by Plaintiff because of
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his previous interactions with Plaintiff regarding the same set of facts and the same Prosecutor?
l.
Did the District Judge err in failing to recognize that Defendant produced NO PICTURES
of Plaintiff trespassing as he told law enforcement and as stated in the probable cause affidavit?
m.
Did the District Judge err in failing to consider that the Defendant refused to answer the
Deputy when he specifically inquired of the Defendant whether the Plaintiff was on the public
roadway or in the gutter (public right of way)?
n.
Did the District Judge err in not recognizing Defendant's extreme negligence in not
checking his property boundaries or with county employees as to whether the public roadway
was his property before having Plaintiff charged?
o. Did the District Judge err in not considering that the Defendant had a duty to fully
and truthfully inform law enforcement so the magistrate could have made an informed decision
regarding the issuance of a probable cause affidavit?

ARGUMENT
Allen indicates that the "advice of counsel defense" is not available in a malicious

prosecution claim if you lie to the police or to the prosecutor. "If the record shows that a
substantial question of fact exists as to whether respondent had stated to counsel all the material
facts know to him the motion for summary judgment should not have been granted." Allen v.
Moyle, 84 Idaho 18, 24,367 P. 2d 579, 583 (1961).

When a party knowingly provides false information, "an intelligent
officer's discretion becomes impossible, and a prosecution based upon
it is procured by the person giving the false information." Restatement
(Second) of Torts§ 653 cmt. G (1977).
In an action for malicious prosecution, the "advice of counsel" defense is predicated upon
"full and fair disclosure" Howard, 85 Idaho at 293-294. There is no distinguishing
between magistrate and law enforcement.
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Defendant stated to the JCSO Dispatch on 24 July 2011 (the date of the alleged trespass)
that Plaintiff was on his property and that he had pictures ... information that was included by the
officer in his Probable Cause Affidavit. Defendant told officer as recorded by the Officer's DVD,
that he had pictures of Plaintiff on his property. The Deputy's notes state that the Defendant
stated that he had pictures of Plaintiff trespassing. However, Defendant testified that he had NO
pictures of Plaintiffon his property and none were produced at trial. Defendant testified multiple
times in court on 5 June 2013 that he never saw Plaintiff on his property.
There is an issue of material fact as to Defendant's "advice of counsel" defense for the
jury to decide in her malicious prosecution claim. In Howard v. Felton, the court has established
that the defense of advice of counsel is equivalent to a showing of probable cause thereby
precluding an action for malicious prosecution. Howard, 85 Idaho 286, 291, 379 P .2d 414, 417.
Further, the court holds that the advice of counsel is only a defense to an action for malicious
prosecution when it appears that the prosecution was initiated in reliance in good faith on
advice given afi:er a full and fair statement to the attorney of all facts. Dawson v. Mead, 98
Idaho 1, 5,557 P. 2d 595, 599 (1976); Allen v. Jvfoyle, 84 Idaho 18, 24-25, 367 P.2d 579 (1961).
The advice of counsel relied upon must come from an independent, disinterested attorney.
Howard, 85 Idaho 286,291, 379 P. 2d 414,417. Prosecutor Robin Dunn revealed in court
that he was/is a long time family friend of the complainant and also has a long history of bias
against Plaintiff. The presiding judge disqualified Mr. Dunn from representing Defendant in the
civil action for violating the I.R.P.C.
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Had Defendant made full and fair disclosure in his statements to law enforcement there
would have been no basis for probable cause. Defendant waited two years before finally
testifying that he never saw Plaintiff on his property. Defendant had Plaintiff charged with
trespass in spite of the fact that his Warranty Deed specifically excluded the public roadway
from his property. Defendant had Plaintiff charged even though there was evidence that there
was another suspect involved according to deputy's Dispatch call .. .information that was
withheld from Plaintiff during her trial and only discovered by happenstance through a discovery
request during the Plaintiff's malicious prosecution action against Defendant.
Defendant is attempting to build a different case now over four years after the alleged
baseless trespassing event. The test for probable cause applies at the time the original case
commenced and the facts document in the Defendant's own words and with his own pictures and
testimony that the Plaintiff at no time ever was on the Defendant's property, that Defendant had
made repeated complaints about Plaintiff (unknown to her because the JCSO found them to be
unfounded), that Defendant and the substantially involved Prosecutor were long time family
friends, that information was withheld indicating another person was involved in the harassment
of Defendant's about his horse, that Defendant has submitted a false affidavit to the court (22
September 2015) in direct conflict with statements previously made by Defendant testimony and
the facts of the matter have already been determined in court resulting in an acquittal of the
Plaintiff.
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SUMMARY

Plaintiff has presented more than a "scintilla' of evidence creating an issue of material
fact that should be presented to a jury:
-Defendant did not provide all material facts known to him.
-Defendant stated that he had pictures of Plaintiff trespassing when he had none;
information that was included in the probable cause affidavit presented to the
magistrate.
-Defendant withheld information that there was a second possible suspect.
-Defendant failed to reveal that he and the Prosecutor were long time friends.
-Defendant had a history of making baseless complaints about Plaintiff
unbeknownst to her and only discovered through discovery requests.
-Defendant testified to the following on 5 June 2013 CR-2011-3409
Court audio recording:
3:37 Defendant testified that he didn't observe Plaintiff getting out of car
4: 11 Defendant testified that he did not see Plaintiff get out of the car
4:55 Defendant testified that he didn't see me get out of the car
5 :25 Defendant testified that he never saw me get out of the car
6:57 Defendant testified that he first saw me walking down the side of the road
7:21 Defendant testified that he didn't see Plaintiff on his property
9:00 Defendant testified that he didn't see me on his property
10:0lDefendnat testified that he did not see me get out of the car
These statements are in direct conflict with Defendant's sworn affidavit of
22 September 2015 and therefore serves to impeach the Defendant.
The "advice of counsel" defense must fail for there was no valid probable cause to charge
Plaintiff with trespass. The probable cause affidavit rather was based upon Defendant's false
statements (which two years later he recanted under oath) and the lack of a "disinterested and
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impartial" prosecutor (Defendant's friend) who was actively involved in Plaintiffs trial as
evidenced by court minutes/signed subpoenas, and direct calls between Defendant and
Prosecutor indicating collusion between Defendant and Prosecutor.
Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a person of
reasonable caution to believe a crime has been committed. Id. If evidence is falsified or withheld,
the probable cause determination is made by considering whether, excluding the falsified
inculpatory evidence or including the withheld exculpatory evidence, probable cause existed to
prosecute. See Pierce, 359 F.3d at 1295. - See more at: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-lOthcircuit/1576115.html#sthash.Xl Ff4gEN.dpuf. Probable Cause: The advice of counsel relied
upon must come from an independent, disinterested attorney. Howard, 85 Idaho 286, 291, 379) .2d 414,
417.
The court has established that the defense of advice of counsel is equivalent to s a showing of
probable cause and that normally this would preclude an action for malicious prosecution. Howard, 85
Idaho 286, 291, 3 79 P.2d 414, 417. Advice of counsel is only a defense for a malicious prosecution
action when it appears that the prosecution was initiated in reliance in good faith on advice given after a
full and fair statement to the attorney of all facts. Dawson v. Mead, 98 Idaho 1, 5, 557 P.2d 595, 599
(1976); Allen v. Moyle, 84 Idaho 18, 24-25, 367 P.2d 579 (1961 ). The advice of counsel relied upon must
come from an independent, disinterested attorney. Howard, 85 Idaho 286, 291, 3 79 P.2d 414, 417.

Summary judgment must be denied if reasonable persons could reach differing
conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence. Smith v. Meridian Joint School
District No. 2, 128 Idaho 714, 718, 918 P.2d 583, 587 (1996).

The facts of this matter demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant acted
in a reckless and malicious manner. No reasonable person would find grounds for Defendant's
complaint against Plaintiff if given a chance to view the evidence and hear testimony.
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Therefore, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the summary judgment order in favor of
Defendant be overturned and that the facts of this case be allowed to be presented to a jury.
Respectfully submitted this

of July, 2016.

ANDI ELLIOTT

APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL

-29

EXHIBITS for Elliott v. Young
Docket No. 44068
Exhibit A Judge's order final page
Exhibit B Letter from Jefferson County Sheriffs Office indicating that an
"anonymous" person continued harassment of Defendant after
he had Plaintiff charged ... dated September 8, 2011.
Exhibit C Copy of JCSO Deputy notes dated July 24, 2011
Exhibit D Defendant's witness statement dated July 24, 2011
Exhibit E Plaintiffs witness statement dated July 24, 2011
Exhibit F Probable Cause Affidavit dated 29 July 2011
Exhibit G Defendant's Warranty Deed (2 pages)
Exhibit H Defendant's sworn affidavit dated September 22, 2015
Exhibit I

JCSO Deputy notes about "anonymous female caller" complaining
about Defendant's horses specifically requesting the Plaintiff
not become involved.
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property) and did not have permission on that date to enter upon the defendant's property1
however, based upon the evidence admltted at trial, the court finds and concludes that tlle
State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, in fact, entered Ol' was
actually on Kurt Young's property (or an area of Kurt Young's property not encompassed
by a public easement and/or right-of-way) on or about July 24, 2011.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the court finds the defendant Not Guilty of Trespass. 2

l The &ding of Not Guilty on tho charge ofTrespm does not rssoJve the ls$Ues enoomp115sed by the
State's Motion for Contempt., which, as sot forth above, will be tried at a later date after appointment of a
special prosecutor.
DECISION FOLLOWING TRIAL
Page4
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Steven P. Anderson
Jefferson Coumv Sheriff
200 Courthouse Wav • Riobv, Idaho 83442
Ph: 208-745-9210 Fax: 208-745-9212

Dear Andi,

02/02/2016

I have been asked to research and locate a telephone recording of an "Anonymous" phone call of a
complaint that was called in about Mr. Kurt Young at 1998 N 2500 E (Old Butte Hwy) in Hamer on
September 8, 2011. The incident shows the time of the call at 1058 a.m .

There is no recording on file

that I can locate. I have searched the recorder for two hours before this call and there is no call being
called in anonymously against Mr. Young. At 1058 a.m. Deputy John Clements called dispatch and
advised dispatch to make an incident; Incident 2011-05063. Deputy Clements told dispatch he did not
know who the Reporting Party was because they kept sending anonymous faxes about animal abuse at
Kurt Young's residence. Dispatch, therefore, had no name to attach as a Reporting Party due to the fact
the Anonymous Caller did not call dispatch.

I hope this helps.

Sincerely,

~~Jcrudu~
Sgt. Mike Miller, Jefferson County 911

~

Jefferson County Sheriff's Office

1104047 001

On 07-24-2011 at approximately 13 :3 7 Hrs dispatch advised me of a
trespass complaint at 1998 N 2500 E in Jefferson County, Idaho. Dispatch
advised the reporting party said that Candace W Elliott AKA (Andi Elliot)
was on his property and his neighbors property. I responded to the area.
Dispatch advised me while I was responding to the area that Candace
had also called in a report of animal abuse at the Dan E Murdoch residence
at 1995 N 2500 E in Jefferson County, Idaho. I advised dispatch to ask
Candace to wait and talk to me in Hamer on the Old Butte Hwy. Dispatch
said Candace said she would wait at her residence at 2498 E 2100 Nin
Jefferson County, Idaho.
I responded to 1998 N 2500 E. I spoke with the reporting party Kurt E
Young. Kurt said that Candace had been on his property and was taking
photos of his and his neighbors horses. Kurt said h ad hotos of Candace
-on his property. Kurt filled out a witness statement.
I spoke with Klurissa Young. Klurissa said she saw a car with two
people in it and a female got out of the car and was on their property taking
pictures of the property and of the Murdoch property as well. Klurissa filled
out a witness statement.
Kurt provided me the photos he had taken of the people on his _ -]
property. !_verified with Kurt that Candace had been on his property not on~'l
the roadway or the gutter area. Kurt said she had been on his property. Kurt
said he wanted to sign a citation for trespassing and disturbing the peace.
~powed Kurt to sign a citatio~ and advised him that I would forward it to the
prosecutor with a full report.

1

c--

I had previously trespassed Candace from Kurt's property on 04-202011 at Kurt's request.
I responded to 1995 N 2500 E. I spoke with Dan Murdoch. Dan said
that his wife saw Candace in the area taking photos of the horses. Dan said
he saw a woman and a man taking photos of their horses and then argued
with Kurt and left the area. Dan filled out a witness statement.
I spoke with Brenda Murdoch. Brenda said she was on the porch
cooking when she saw Candace taking pictures of the horses and driving
back and forth past the property. Brenda said that Candace got out of the car
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TN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH DISTRICT JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OFzJEf[iERSON
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
U!
UG 18 AH 8:

02

STATEOFIDAHO,

)

Case$.e£.~ao11- ,~~~lfd~~?.LJRr,

)

Plaintiff

)

vs

(tobcussignedbyClcrk)

(,JD}.Ho

)

)

PROBABLE CAUSE AFFIDA vrr

Candace White Elliott
Defendant
State of Idaho, County of Jefferson, ss.
John Clements, the undersigned, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
I. I am a peace officer employed by Jefferson County Sheriffs Office.
2. The Defendant was arrested on

at _ _. ,_n_. am

n

pm for the crime(s) of:

I 8-7008 trespass
8-6409(1) disturbing the peace

J

3. The crime(s) occurred in the County of.Jefferson.
4. How was the defendant identified? Witnesses
5. Tlie crime(s) was committed in my presence

D Yes

~ No

6. ! believe that there is probable cause to believe the Defendant committed such crirnes(s)
because of the following facts (Note: You must state the source of all information provided
below. State what you observed and what you learned from someone else, identifying that
person): On 07-24-2011 at approximately 13:37 Hrs dispatch advised me of a trespass at
l 998 N 2500 E in Jefferson County, Idaho. While I was enroute to 1998 N 2500 E dispatch
advised me that Candace White Elliott aka (Andi Elliott) called reporting animal abuse at
1995 N 2500 E. On my arrival at l 998 N 2500 EI met with Kurt E Young. Kurt said that
Candace W Elliott had been on his propert taking photo's of his neigbor Dan Murdoch's'
-propeity and animals. Kurt said he had trespassed Can ace rorn bis property and he wanted
her charged with trespassing and disturbing the peace. Kurt said Candace had been on hi~
property not on the roadwa:t- I spoke with Klmissa Young. Klurissa said she saw Cnnclace
out of her vehicle on the property taking photos and driving by the home severnl times.~
.~bad photos of Candace, Kurt provided the photos to me.
7. l checked the Sheriffs Office records ond found that J had trespassed Candace from Kun's
prope11y on 04-20-201 l at Kurt's request.
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STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss.

COUNTY OF JEFFERSON

)

Z0i

On this
day of
, 20ll, b fore me, the undersigned, a Notary
· h._,k_,, v lLtuJ k~"'tS
, un
Public in and for said State, pers nall appeared
individual, known or identified to me to be the person 'hose name is subscribed to the
within instrument, and acknowledged to me that he/she executed the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal
the day and year in this certificate first above written.

"--1ri'l !s:.Jdlv ~~
N~1c~ornu1,110 .
Res1drng at: _£ ~ 1.,$:LJV'-..;

_J}:J:Z_{_Q

·----

_ I- - - - - · · · · - - ·

My commission expires:---------·--·
Or

Person Authorized to administer oaths
Title - - - - - - - - - - - - ·

Page 2 of3

~

,.,

AFTER RECORDING MAIL TO:

lilnstrument # 336948
RRIGBY, JEFFERSON, IDAHO
04:10:00 No. of Pages: 2
22005-01-25

Kurt Young and Kaylene Young
1998 North 2500 East
Hamer, ID 83442

RRecorded for: FIRST AMERICAN TITLE

CCHRISTINE BOULTER

~4':~0~

EEx•Officlo Recorder Oeputy_..........!~~-"--1n1ndex to: WARRANiY DEED

WARRANTY DEED
File No.: 105003-RI {II)

Date: January 20, 2005

For Value Received, Michael D. Hunter and Lisa Hunter, husband and wife, hereinafter called the
Grantor, hereby grants, bargains, sells and conveys unto Kurt Young and Kaylene Young, husband
and wife, hereinafter called the Grantee, whose current address Is 1998 North 2500 East, Hamer,
ID 83442, the following described premises, situated in Jefferson County, Idaho, to-wit:
PARCEL 1: TOWNSHIP 7 NORTH, RANGE 36 E.B.M., JEFFERSON COUNTY, IDAHO,
SECTION 23: ALL THAT PART OF THE SW1f4SW 1/4 OF SAID SECTION 23 LYING WEST OF THE
RAILROAD RIGHT-OF-WAY,
EXCEPTING THEREFROM: BEGINNING AT THE SW CORNER OF THE SW1/4 SW1/4 OF SAID
SECTION 23, AND RUNNING THENCE NORTH 430 FEET; THENCE EAST TO THE WEST RIGHTOF·WAY OF AN EXISTING RAILROAD; THENCE SOUTHEASTERLY, FOLLOWING THE WEST •
RIGHT-OF-WAY OF SAID RAILROAD TO THE INTERSECTION WITH THE SOUTH UNE OF THE
SW1/4SW14; THENCE WEST TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING,
PARCEL 2: TOWNSHIP 7 NORTH, RANGE 36 E,B,M., JEFFERSON COUNTY, IDAHO.
BEGINNING AT THE SW CORNER OF THE SW% SWl/4 OF SAID SECTION 23, AND RUNNING
THENCE NORTH 430 FEET; THENCE EAST TO THE WEST RIGHT-OF-WAY OF AN EXISTING
RAILROAD; THENCE SOUTHEEASTERLY, FOLLOWING THE WEST RIGHT-OF-WAY OF SAID
RAILROAD TO THE INTERSECTION WitH THE SOUTH UNE OF THE SW 1/4SW1/4i THENCE

WEST TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING
SUBJECT TO all easements, right of ways, covenants, restrictions, reseivations, appllcable building and
zoning ordinances and use regulations and restrictions of record, and payment of accruing present year
taxes and assessments as agreed to by partles above.
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Warranty Deed
• continued

Date: 01/20/2005

Fl!e No.: 105003-ru (II)

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the sald premises, with its appurtenances, unto the said Grantee, and to the
Grantee's heirs and assigns forever. And the said Grantor does hereby covenant to and with the said
Grantee, that the Granter is the owner in fee simple of said premises; that said premises are free from all
encumbrances except current years taxes, levies, and assessments, and except U.S. Patent reservations,
restrictions, easements of record and easements visible upon the premises, and that Granter will warrant
and defend the same from all claims whatsoever.

STATE OF

Idaho

)

ss.
COUNTY OF

On this

Jefferson

)

d.J.

day of January, 2005, before me, a Notary Publlc in and for said State, personally appeared
Michael D. Hunter and Lisa Hunter, known or ldentffied to me to be the person(s) whose name(s) is/are

subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that he/she/they executed the same.
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Royce B. Lee, P.A.
Attorney at Law
770 South Woodruff Avenue
Idaho Falls, Idaho 8340 I
Telephone: (208) 524-2652
Facsimile: (208) 524-2051
Idaho State Bar # 1691
Attorney for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON
CANDACE "ANDI" W. ELLIOTT,
Petitioner,
V.

KURT E. YOUNG, SR.,

______________
Respondent.

)

)
)

Case No. CV-2015-04

)
)

AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR

)

SUMMARYJDUGMENT

)
)
)

)

COMES NOW ~urt E. Young, Sr., under oath and swears and deposes as follows:
I. My name is Kurt E. Young, Sr. I am the Defendant in the above ·case.

2. On July 24, 2011, I was at my home in Hamer, Idaho, shortly after 1:00 p.m. I saw a
white car parked in my driveway facing north. Candace Elliott got out of the
passenger side and walked around the car onto the public road. The driver then drove

the car to another section of my driveway.
3. The place where the car was first stopped and Candace Elliott got out of the car is
located on my property. The edge of the car and the place where she got out of the car

-

was approximately 31 to 31 and 1/2 feet from the center of the road. The road is about
22 feet wide so my half is about 11 feet. Attached as Exhibit A is a correct copy ofmy
AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-!

Wa1Tanty Deed. It show s I own to the SW Corner of the SW 114 SW Y.t of Section 23 .
That comer is in the middle of the county road in front of my house.

4. I called the Jefferson County Sheriffs Department to complain about Candace Elliott
trespassing on my property. Candace Elliott had been previously " trespassed",
meaning, at my request, she had been told by Jefferson County Sheriff Deputy John
Clements, on April 20, 2011, that she was not allowed to come on my property.

5. Deputy John Clements came to my house to respond to my phone call. I explained to
him what I had seen, including where the car was located when the car was first
parked in my driveway and she got out of the car. I pointed specifically to that
location so the deputy could see where it was.
6. The deputy told me that ifhe had seen her on my property he could have arrested her
for trespassing.

7. Deputy Clements gave me a paper called a citation. He asked me ifI wanted to sign it
against Candace Elliott for trespassing. Based on what the Deputy Clements just told
me, I told him that I did. I did so believing that Candace Elliott was in fact on my
private property on that day.

8. Although I signed a citation it was never used in the criminal case against Candace
Elliott.
9. Deputy Clements prepared a Probable Cause Affidavit which was filed with the Court
on August 18, 2011. A copy of that repo1i is attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit B.
According to Deputy Clements' Affidavit, "Kmi said that Candace W. Elliott had

AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION TO PLA INTIFF' S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT -2

been on his property taking photos of his neighbor Dan Murdock's property and
animals . Kurt said Candace had been on his property not on the roadway.
10. The Jefferson County Prosecuting Attorney prepared a Criminal Complaint against
Candace White Elliott in Case No. CR-11-3409. It was filed with the Court on August
22, 2011, approximately twenty-nine days after I signed the citation. The Criminal
Complaint was signed under oath by John Clements, Jefferson County Sheriff Deputy.

It was witnessed by Judge Robe11 Crowley. A copy of that Complaint is attached
hereto as Exhibit C.
11. The Jefferson County Prosecutor decided to file the Criminal Complaint against
Candace Elliott. I did not have any further contact with the prosecuting attorney or
the sheriffs office after my discussion with Deputy Clements on July 24, 2011, and
before the Criminal Complaint was filed.
12. I was called as a witness in the trial against Candace Elliott but I was not the
prosecuting party in that case. I did not participate in the decision by the Prosecutor to
file charges against Candace Elliott.
13. On April 20, 2011, Candace Elliott came to my property and I saw her taking pictures
of my property. It appeared she was taking pictures of my house and I was concerned
that she was actually trying to take pictures of my children. As a result I asked the
Jefferson County Sheriff's Depat1ment to notify Candace Elliott that she was
"trespassed" from my property, which he did .
14. When Candace Elliott came to my property on July 24, 2011, and actually trespassed
on my property and was taking pictures of my neighbor's property, it was
AFFIDAVIT JN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT -3

upsetting to me as I had given her notice not to come on my property. I believed that,
and still believe, that she was ~roperty on July 24, 2011, as compared to being

OJ

· on the public roadway or right-of-way.
15 . When I spoke with Deputy Clements I explained to him exactly what I had seen about
Candace Elliott being on my property. He indicated to me that based on what I
showed to him that she was guilty of trespassing. He then asked me ifl wanted to sign
the citation against her. Based on what I understood at that time and the infonnation I
received from Deputy Clements I signed the citation. I did so believing I was correct
and that she had trespassed on my property.

16. The information contained in Deputy Clements' Probable Cause Affidavit about
Candace Elliott being on my property on July 24, 2011, is correct. I believe there was

a reasonable basis for me and for Deputy Clements to state that she had trespassed on
my property.
DATED this ~ a y of September, 2015 .

1{1u::t S~ o ~

Kurt Young
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- - ---·-·------------~ -

STATE OF IDAHO ~

Cmmty of

)

B'/nJinl),Ji.f \

1n , .

On this ~d-day of September, in the year 2015, before me~---:
a notary public in and for the State of Idaho, personally appeared Kurt Young, known or
identified to me to be the person whose name is subscrib to the within ins
nt, and
acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

(SEAL)
ROYCE B. LEE

Notary Public fi r Idaho
My Commission Expires:

Notary Public
State of Idaho
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following this
day of July 2016 by prepaid mail or hand delivery.

Royce B. Lee, Esq.
770 Woodruff Ave.
Idaho Falls, ID 83401

ANDI ELLIOTT

